By Freyr Efling
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May 28, 2026
The Central Bank's interest rate hikes are in fact tax increases that fall almost exclusively on indebted households, young people and lower‑income groups, writes Stefán Ólafsson, professor emeritus and expert at Efling, in a new article. The article points out that those who generate the greatest demand pressure in the economy, higher‑income and wealthier groups, feel little impact from the rate hikes and may even profit from them. In the article, Stefán argues that interest rate hikes are both unfair and ineffective ways to combat inflation. While indebted households have had to bear hundreds of thousands of krona increases in payment obligations, banks and capital owners have profited enormously. He believes a more targeted and fair approach would be to apply temporary tax increases to the wealthier groups instead of “taxing the wrong group“. In fact, a general tax increase would be a much more targeted and quicker way to curb inflation by reducing private consumption. Revenue from interest rate hikes goes to banks and capital owners, creating excessive bank profits, whereas revenue from tax increases would go to the state treasury. Stefán also criticizes the current economic policy for being based on outdated neoliberal ideas and calls for a new policy that prioritizes welfare, justice and effective economic management. An interest rate hike is a tax increase on the wrong group. An interest rate hike is equivalent to a tax increase that falls only on those who are indebted. The ones who owe the most are younger people struggling to start families and acquire housing, and some also with large student debts. Those with less savings and lower incomes have to borrow more due to housing purchases. These are specific groups in society, but not everyone. The higher‑income and wealthier find little or no impact from these charges on debtors, both because of lower debt and higher income. The indebted and lower‑income are not the main drivers of inflation; rather it is the higher‑income and wealthier, who have more spending power. This tax increase on debtors therefore does not reduce consumption and investment of the higher‑income and wealthier, but primarily burdens wage earners in the working and middle classes. Through interest rate hikes, the wrong group is being taxed. The central bank continues to raise rates/taxes on these people in the hope of counteracting inflation. Why is this the main remedy even though its effect is small? To answer this, it is useful to recall the premises of monetary policy. The monetary policy, as explained by Forsend of the central bank, is generally that inflation is due to excessive demand in the economy (excessive consumption, excessive investment). That is because too much money is in circulation (public wages are too high, loan money is too abundant and too cheap). Demand pressure, however, is only one of many possible causes of inflation. Other causes call for other measures.[1] But we will wait on that. According to the monetary theory of Milton Friedman and other neoliberals, the solution is to reduce the money supply in circulation. Interest rate hikes have been the method for this and have been fashionable in recent years in the West, but they “unexpectedly” hurt those who have the least wealth the most. The ones who have the most money in circulation are the richer half of the population, capital owners and well‑doing companies. It could be assumed that monetary policy tried to slow down the circulation of their money the most. But this has not been fashionable, probably because the richest people who have the most power and their economists want to protect themselves. The aim of interest rate hikes is essentially to reduce purchasing power and investment capacity in the economy. To reduce demand pressure on inflation. The similarities and differences between interest rate hikes and tax hikes. Interest rate hikes try to achieve the same effects that a general tax increase would achieve. In fact, a general tax increase would be a far more targeted and quicker way to curb inflation. It can reduce the purchasing power of the entire public (decreasing private consumption) and if it also falls on companies and capital owners, it will likely also reduce investment in the economy. There are also other ways to reduce investment (e.g., central bank precautionary tools and regulation of financial markets). Interest rate hikes affect demand in the same way as tax hikes, but with a much more limited impact. The advantage of a tax increase for the authorities over an interest rate hike is that it is much easier to steer the impact of a tax increase onto the groups and industries that generate the most demand pressure – which are usually not the lower‑income half of the population. Thus, tax increases can be far more targeted than interest rate hikes on debtors. With more targeted action, one does not have to sacrifice as much economic growth as accompanies the central bank's rate hikes. Although the effects of rate hikes are the same as direct tax increases for those affected, there is a rational difference in implementation. An interest rate hike is a tax increase that the central bank and commercial banks control, and the revenues from it go to banks, capital owners and pension funds (i.e., to the financial market), not to the state treasury as occurs with tax increases implemented by the government. Therefore, rate hikes lead to excessive bank profits, as they have the largest loans. The profit is then paid out as dividends to bank owners and as bonuses to managers . It would be far more beneficial for the public if this money went entirely into the state coffers and was used to prevent deficits in the budget and to maintain infrastructure and welfare. If targeted, moderate and temporary tax increases had been applied instead of rate hikes when inflation surged in 2022 and 2023, the fiscal deficit could have been eliminated much earlier, a deficit that arose during the Covid period and was mostly due to support for companies in tourism‑related industries. This would have changed everything for the inflation rate thereafter. Then we would not be in any trouble now and could focus on strengthening economic growth, infrastructure and welfare. The distribution of burdens from rate hikes and tax hikes is different. Rate hikes work exactly like tax hikes but fall mostly on the wrong groups if the intention is to use them to reduce demand pressure caused by excessive private consumption and investment. When such actions against a common problem (inflation) are directed only at a limited segment of society, they must be harsher than if they were broader and more targeted. A single rate hike can increase the payment burden of an indebted family by tens of thousands of krona per month. A rapid short‑term rate hike (e.g., from 2% to 9.25% as in 2022 and 2023) becomes a massive tax increase on indebted families. For many, repayments on non‑indexed loans rose during this period by between 100 and 200 thousand krona per month. Smaller companies that borrow on the domestic market transmit the effects of these rate hikes directly into price levels. This is an example of a rate hike leading directly to higher inflation. It is, of course, the huge flaw of rate hikes! Large export companies take loans abroad and do not feel the rate hikes here. Foreign parties that build hotels here also do not. These parties are exempt, although they can cause significant demand pressure! Rate hikes do not reduce investments of pension funds, which are generally the largest source of capital in the economy. Another flaw is that rate hikes do not reduce private consumption of roughly two million tourists who visit the country each year. Those who owe less (often older people and those with higher incomes), as well as affluent capital owners who have recently increased their savings, feel little or nothing from the tax increases embedded in rate hikes. In fact, parties in these groups can profit from rate hikes, e.g., through higher returns on savings – which is then equivalent to a tax cut for them. And these are precisely the societal groups that primarily drive inflationary demand pressure, with high consumption and investment. This is, in short, all wrong! Rate hikes are therefore in reality a very unfair and ineffective measure, a poorly designed tax increase, which has proven to deliver limited success in reducing inflation. Why can we accept a large tax increase on the younger, lower‑income and less‑wealthy, in the form of rate hikes, while the better‑off are protected and even pampered? Why? Why not raise taxes on the most affluent? When it is argued that rate hikes are nothing but tax hikes that only target a limited portion of the population (usually the wrong groups), injustice and unfairness are evident. Why not tax those who generate the most demand pressure, the wealthier and higher‑income? Then this method could start delivering real results in lowering inflation. Adam Smith, the father of economics, advocated that the wealthier should bear the greatest tax burden. If taxes need to be raised temporarily to curb demand pressure, the tax increase should primarily be directed at the wealthy – if one wishes to follow Adam Smith's prescription. In reality it would be sensible not to raise taxes on the lower‑income and less‑wealthy, but only on the affluent, who truly bear the burden and are largely responsible for inflation. That would be a path of welfare capitalism in the spirit of John Maynard Keynes and the founders of the welfare state idea, such as Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and William Beveridge. We should aim there, not towards the American wealth of the few. But to go that way, politicians and their economists must step out of the narrow neoliberal framework and have the courage to change the functioning of society, with both more just and more efficient economic governance. We should not sacrifice economic growth on the altar of rate hikes, which are based on outdated and unfair neoliberal ideas (see my article in the source "Efnahagslífið: Stöðnun til 2028?"). Hopefully the government of Kristrún Frostadóttir has been able to take real steps in this direction, as well as to intervene in the housing market and financial market with regulation, as I have previously pointed out (see, for example, the article "Verðbólgan: Betri leið er í boði"). The time for real changes in economic policy has been long overdue. Stefán Ólafsson is a professor emeritus at HÍ and works as an expert at Efling. The article first appears in the source on 26 May 2026. [1] Demand pressure is obviously not the only possible cause of inflation, and therefore the monetary policy perspective is insufficient from the start. Other causes include imported inflation (price increases on the world market for oil, food, etc.), profit‑driven inflation (e.g., unchecked rises in rent and housing prices that can be traced to imbalances in the housing market, etc.) and simply companies' pursuit of higher profits. Finally, there is the countless demand pressure that follows the rapid increase in foreign tourists, among other things. Other causes than demand pressure call for other remedies than the use of rate hikes.